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Recently, public health advocates struck a blow against tobacco 
companies by barring them from bringing challenges under some 
international trade deals. In this Article, I explain why other governments 
should adopt similar tobacco “carve-outs.” Specifically, I argue that it is 
mainly the industry’s aggressive litigation tactics—not the hazardous nature 
of this consumer product—that justifies treating it in an exceptional manner 
for the purposes of international litigation. To illustrate my point, first, I 
explain the nature of the carve-out in relation to a topology of legal forms 
used to exclude policy areas, economic sectors, and particular industries 
from obligations stipulated in international economic agreements. I follow 
with a case study of Phillip Morris International to explain how the industry, 
by relying on litigation before international courts and tribunals, has aimed 
at delaying, preempting, and weakening harmonized anti-smoking 
regulations. I finish by proposing modest ways to refine “Multinational 
Enterprise or MNE theory,” which aims at understanding the choices of 
extending control over subsidiaries operating abroad. In particular, I argue 
for increasing the recognition of international legal capacity and 
adjudicatory options in conceptualizing ownership, location, and 
internalization advantages. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The tobacco “carve-out” in the recently concluded Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) represents an 
important development in international law.1 The carve-out permits TPP 
State members to block corporations from using the controversial investor-
state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) mechanism to obtain damages resulting 
from tobacco control measures.  For the first time in recent history, an 
international commercial treaty of this nature and magnitude treats a 
particular business sector exceptionally for the purpose of legal standing in 
international litigation.  Not only that, but this mechanism seems to be 
spreading across treaties. Why are governments “singling out tobacco,” the 
industry wonders?2 The short answer is simple:  because governments can 
and because governments should do so. 
In this Article, I deal mostly with the second part of the answer—why 
governments should follow this emerging trend and adopt tobacco carve-outs 
of this nature. Specifically, I argue that it is the industry’s aggressive 
litigation tactics—not only the hazardous nature of this consumer product—
that supports this particular type of disparate treatment before a dispute 
settlement process. To illustrate my point, first, I explain the nature of the 
carve-out in relation to a topology of legal forms employed to exclude policy 
areas, economic sectors or particular industries from legal obligations 
stipulated in treaties. I follow by using the example of Phillip Morris 
International (“PMI”) to explain how the industry, by relying on litigation 
before international courts and tribunals, aims at delaying, preempting and 
 
 1. See The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 29.5, 
Feb. 22, 2018, Vietnam Chamber of Commerce And Industry, http://www.trungtamwto.vn/sites/ 
default/files/tpp/29.-exceptions-and-general-provisions.pdf.  
 2. Danny Hakim, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Works Globally to Fight Anti-Smoking Measures, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/business/international/us-chamber-
works-globally-to-fight-antismoking-measures.html. Australia and Singapore have agreed to amend their 
Free Trade Agreement to include a tobacco carve-out. See Agreement to Amend the Singapore-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement, ch. 3, art. 22, Feb. 17, 2003 (as amended), Australian Deptartment of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/safta/Documents/agreement-to-amend-the-
singapore-australia-free-trade-agreement.pdf. 
PUIG FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2018  7:07 AM 
2018] THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TOBACCO TACTICS 497 
weakening (in that order) anti-smoking regulations. The use of these 
litigation tactics is well documented in the United States where legal and 
constitutional provisions prohibit insulating such regulations from legal 
challenges before the courts.3 However, given that there are few if any legal 
impediments to restricting these claims internationally, there is no reason for 
governments to allow the exportation of such provisions to international 
courts. Rather, governments should adopt an approach that treats this carve-
out as a practice for future commercial deals. 
At a conceptual level, the case of tobacco litigation and the carve-out 
illustrate the paradoxical reality that international business and economic law 
may often result in the over-empowerment of economic actors, with resulting 
difficulties for governments attempting to regulate in the public interest.  The 
case shows how ownership, location, and internalization of subsidiaries by 
Multinational Enterprises (“MNEs”) provide such corporations with 
advantages, including the utilization and deployment of legal expertise and 
capacity. As international governance is taking on increasingly more 
contentious regulatory topics, understanding the global litigation strategies 
of MNEs is more pressing. Such understanding may reveal more about the 
real power that corporations enjoy today and how international law can 
constrain but also enable the use of such power. 
I. BACKGROUND 
When it comes to tobacco consumption, the progress made in the United 
States has been overshadowed by the increase of smoking in low- and 
middle-income countries.  In fact, such increase is significant enough to 
offset the decrease in high-income countries.4 This consumption growth is 
sustained, in part, by economic integration and trade liberalization—the 
reduction of tariffs and the removal of other regulatory barriers to 
commercial activities. Until recently, tobacco enjoyed the same benefits 
provided to other industries in free trade and commercial agreements 
(“FTAs”), including potential access to international dispute settlement. 
Here, I explain the significance of the tobacco carve-out and the relevance 
of the exceptional form of institutionalization adopted in the treaty. 
 
 3. Along with stricter textual warnings drafted by Congress, these graphic warning images were 
to appear on the top 50 percent of all cigarette packages and cover 20 percent of print advertisements. See 
generally, D.C. Circuit Holds that FDA Rule Mandating Graphic Warning Images on Cigarette 
Packaging and Advertisements Violates First Amendment, 126 HARV. L. REV. 818 (2013).  
 4. MICHAEL ERIKSEN ET. AL., THE TOBACCO ATLAS, 30–31 (John M. Daniel et. al. eds., 4th ed., 
2015), www.tobaccoatlas.org/uploads/Images/PDFs/Tobacco_Atlas_2ndPrint.pdf. 
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A. The Tobacco Carve-Out: A Breakthrough 
A few years ago, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) warned that 
tobacco could kill one billion people this century.5 For most Americans, this 
registered as white noise, mostly because more than eighty percent of 
potential victims now live in low- and middle-income countries.6 
Nevertheless, American legal, institutional, and policy choices have 
substantially contributed to this problematic trend. 
As has been well documented, tobacco’s global success is partly the 
result of FTAs that mandate the removal of import taxes and other 
commercial restrictions on most goods, including tobacco products.7 Both 
Republican and Democratic administrations have supported the tobacco 
industry in trade deals and awarded federal subsidies to tobacco growers and 
exporters for eight decades.8 These generous subsidies were only ended (at 
least for now) in 2014.9 U.S. policymakers long maintained that since 
cigarettes are legally sold in the United States and abroad, trade officials 
should treat the industry no differently in commercial agreements.10 A 1990 
congressional report issued at the dawn of major trade negotiations noted the 
 
 5. See Tobacco Could Kill a Billion People This Century, UN Health Official Warns, UN NEWS 
CENTRE (Apr. 29, 2011), www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38240#.Vu7l3xIrKV4. 
 6. According to the World Health Organization, member States are grouped into four income 
groups (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high) based on the World Bank’s list of analytical income 
classification of economies. See Health Statistics and Information Systems: Definition of Region 
Groupings, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2016), www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/ 
definition_regions/en. 
 7. See, e.g., Robert Stumberg, Safeguards for Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA, 39 AM. J. 
OF L. & MED. 382, 382–83 (2013); but see, Jeffery Drope & Jenina Joy Chavez, Complexities at the 
Intersection of Tobacco Control and Trade Liberalization: Evidence from Southeast Asia, 24 TOBACCO 
CONTROL e128, e129 (2014) (pointing to some complex methodological issues in studying the effects of 
trade liberalization and the level of tobacco consumption). 
 8. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31; Tobacco Control Act, ch. 866, 48 Stat. 
1275 (1934) (establishing price support and production adjustment for tobacco). For recent discussion on 
their elimination, see Emily McCord, Tobacco Farmers Lose Longtime Safety Net, NPR (Oct. 24, 2014), 
www.npr.org/2014/10/24/357947259/tobacco-farmers-lose-longtime-safety-net.  In fact, since the 1960s 
countries like Malawi have complained about the effects of U.S. subsidies in global markets and on local 
(Malawi) production. See Statement by the Representative of Malawi Before the Council of 
Representatives for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, United States Subsidy on Manufactured 
Tobacco (Nov. 6, 1967), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90800173.pdf. 
 9. See McCord, supra note 8. 
 10. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bollyky, The Tobacco Problem in U.S. Trade, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/trade/tobacco-problem-us-trade/p31346. But see Stan Sesser, Opium 
War Redux, NEW YORKER (Sept. 13, 1993) https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/09/13/opium-
war-redux (quoting Dr. James Mason, Assistant Secretary for Health in the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services under President George H.W. Bush, as saying: “Our country has been known for its 
humanitarian and health-related projects worldwide. This is a hundred and eighty degrees opposite. We’re 
talking about millions of lives—and that totally outweighs and overwhelms what we’ve accomplished in 
the humanitarian field. It’s outrageous for the United States to allow this misery and suffering to occur.”). 
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“conflict . . . between U.S. trade goals and health policy objectives,” but to 
no avail.11 
The tobacco “carve-out” included in the original and reaffirmed in the 
recently concluded TPP represents a historic shift—a shift that is 
spreading.12 The carve-out allows TPP member countries to block 
corporations from using the ISDS mechanism to receive compensation for 
commercial damages resulting from tobacco control measures.13 For the first 
time, an international commercial treaty treats tobacco companies 
exceptionally—recognizing that tobacco is somehow different than other 
commercial products. As expected, the industry argues that the TPP carve-
out unfairly targets tobacco products; “singling out tobacco [will] open a 
Pandora’s box as other governments go after their particular bêtes noires,” 
they claim.14 
B. The Carve-Out Form: An “Odd” Choice 
Beyond the important breakthrough, the tobacco carve-out stands out 
because of the legal form to institutionalize an exception to the rule. The 
carve-out applies only to investor-state arbitration, a controversial form of 
investment dispute settlement. Under this mechanism, companies can sue 
governments before ad hoc tribunals of party-appointed arbitrators for 
damages that result from governmental action or omission.  Because there is 
no formal appeals process, the decisions issued by the tribunals are subject 
to very little oversight. 
In general, controversial topics that deserve exceptional treatment in 
international treaties like FTAs are formalized in one of the following three 
legal forms: 
 
 11. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/NSIAD-90-190, TRADE AND HEALTH ISSUES: 
DICHOTOMY BETWEEN U.S. TOBACCO EXPORT POLICY AND ANTISMOKING INITIATIVES 5 (1990), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/149076.pdf. 
 12. See Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Reached, but Faces Scrutiny in Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-
deal-is-reached.html. 
 13. See TPP, supra note 1, art. 29.5 ( “A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 
9 (Investment) with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party. Such a claim 
shall not be submitted to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party has made such 
an election. If a Party has not elected to deny benefits with respect to such claims by the time of the 
submission of such a claim to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment), a Party may elect to 
deny benefits during the proceedings. For greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny benefits with respect 
to such claims, any such claim shall be dismissed.”). 
 14. Danny Hakim, supra note 2. The carve-out has also been criticized by “progressive” 
organizations on the ground that it confirms the lack of regulatory space. See, e.g., Katherine Hirono, 
Deborah Gleeson, & Becky Freeman, To What Extent Does a Tobacco Carve-Out Protect Public Health 
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,  26(2) PUB. HEALTH RES. PRAC. at e2621622.  
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-General exceptions which use permissive language for the pursuit of a 
particular public policy, but then impose some restrictions on the design 
of the measure by specifying a required nexus between the measure and 
the permissible objective, such as “necessary to protect [objective X].” 
-Carve-outs which exempt an entire policy area, industry or economic 
sector from the scope of a treaty. This form may also include internal 
qualifications on the scope of the obligation within the context of the 
clause itself, in a proximate clause, or in an interpretative annex. Carve-
outs tend to identify a particular area of exclusion with language such as 
“do not apply to a measure designed to protect [objective Y].” 
-Treaty reservations which allow treaty parties to unilaterally nominate a 
sector, industry or policy area in relation to which they reserve the right to 
adopt or maintain otherwise non-conforming measures. These exclusions 
generally rely on language such as “…nothing in this Agreement shall 
preclude the adoption by [country] of measures it deems necessary to 
[objective Z].”15 
Under international law, the specific mechanism used to codify the 
exceptional treatment of a particular subject matter may have legal and 
interpretative consequences that are beyond the scope of this work.16 One 
should note, however, that carve-outs and reservations quarantine specific 
sectors, industries, or policy areas ex ante. Exceptions, on the other hand, 
preserve policy space for ex post exigencies.  Hence, the tobacco carve-out 
in the TPP sits in a strange place:  it enables State members to curtail the 
right to a private right of action or to block an existing legal claim, but only 
if the case concerns a particular policy area, i.e., tobacco control. 
Nevertheless, under the treaty, companies can still internationally trade and 
invest in tobacco. Also, any of the signatory parties to the TPP can still bring 
legal claims if they believe another governmental party to the treaty is 
regulating tobacco products for trade-protectionist reasons rather than to 
protect public health. 
A close look at this topology of legal forms allows us to identify what 
the carve-out is not. For one, the tobacco carve-out is not a tobacco treaty 
reservation. The TPP could have gone further by exempting tobacco and 
tobacco products from the treaty commitments more generally. This would 
have allowed governments to adopt tariffs and other non-tariff barriers on 
tobacco products as well as to block investments in local tobacco production, 
distribution and branding. Practically speaking, this legal form could have 
been more effective in dealing with the public health consequences of 
 
 15. Caroline Henckels, The Exception Proves the Rule? The Role of Public Policy Exceptions in 
Trade and Investment Agreements (on file with author). 
 16. For an analysis of the main substantial issues raised by reservations, see generally Alain Pellet, 
The International Law Commission’s Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties: A General 
Presentation by the Special Rapporteur 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1061 (2013)  
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tobacco, especially if coupled with consumption taxes, as the combination 
could potentially raise revenue and reduce demand, particularly in poor 
countries like Vietnam.17 
The TPP carve-out is also not a general “public health exception.” Such 
a legal form may have served broader health purposes, including by 
insulating other regulatory domains.  For example, it could help to constrain 
actors such as pharmaceutical companies or soft-drink distributors that are 
often empowered by FTAs and that may take actions that compromise the 
achievement of other public health goals.18 What then, could possibly 
explain the “odd” choice of the tobacco carve-out? 
II. INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO LITIGATION: 
THE CASE OF PHILIP MORRIS 
The carve-out comes in the wake of two related trends. On the one hand, 
tobacco companies are strategically using international dispute settlement, 
such as ISDS, to challenge tobacco control measures around the world, 
including bans of flavored cigarettes; marketing and advertising restrictions; 
labeling requirements of health risks; import and export taxes; price, import, 
and export controls; and brand registration recognition. On the other hand, 
in part because of international cases involving tobacco, litigation has incited 
growing resistance to ISDS.19 
In this section, I use the case study of PMI, a company implicated in 
one-third of thirty-nine international cases tracked by a recent study, to 
explain the use of international litigation to defeat the efforts of governments 
to constrain the industry.20 First, I discuss how PMI indirectly used litigation 
before the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)21—the cornerstone of trade 
governance—to challenge the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
 
 17. See Michele Goodwin, Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Watch Out, Joe Camel is Back: Tobacco 
and the TPP, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michele-
goodwin/watch-out-joe-camel-is-ba_b_7177592.html. There are currently fewer than 8,000 tobacco 
farmers in the United States. Hence, the impact on U.S. jobs would be minimal. 
 18. See Amy Kapczynski, The Trans-Pacific Partnership—Is It Bad for Your Health?, 373 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 201, 202 (2015). 
 19. See Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-
in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-
e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.b758defdf9b6 (describing ISDS panels as “rigged pseudo-courts” 
that favor multinational corporations at the expense of sovereign states and their citizens).  
 20. See generally Puig, supra note 17 (based on 39 cases brought before international courts and 
tribunals, the author found that at least 13 cases (or 34% of the surveyed cases) directly or indirectly 
(through an affiliated company) involved Philip Morris International). 
 21. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
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Control Act. Second, I discuss the use of multiple international litigation 
venues, but notably, ISDS, to challenge the goals of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (“FCTC”). The FCTC is a widely ratified 
treaty negotiated at the WHO and the most important transnational 




















Figure 1: International tobacco cases by Party involved (n=39) 
A. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
In 2009, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
became law in the United States. Among other provisions, the Act banned 
the production and sale of clove and other flavored cigarettes as an effort to 
reduce youth smoking.23 According to a 2006 study, clove cigarettes are 
known as “trainer cigarettes” that may serve as a gateway product for more 
tobacco use.24 Menthol cigarettes, however, were not included in the ban, 
 
 22. See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166 
[hereinafter FCTC]. 
 23. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 907, 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2009). 
 24. Mark Drajem & Lorraine Woellert, Clove Cigarettes May Prompt U.S., Indonesia Dispute 
(Update 1), SOUTHEAST ASIA TOBACCO CONTROL ALLIANCE (May 19, 2009), https://seatca.org/?p=202. 
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though they are another type of flavored cigarette that is popular among 
minors.25 
Unlike menthols, clove and other flavored cigarettes are not produced 
in the United States. At the time the clove cigarette ban was put into place, 
PMI was the sole owner of the subsidiary that exported all such products into 
the United States from, and shared the largest market of clove cigarettes in, 
Indonesia. In 2005, PMI “indigenized” in Indonesia and acquired PT HM 
Sampoerna, then a family business that held close to 20% of the share in the 
local cigarette market. 
In 2010, a year after the Act was passed, Indonesia brought a lawsuit 
before the WTO, reportedly after heavy lobbying by PMI’s local subsidiary. 
In the proceedings, the WTO agreed with Indonesia that the U.S. ban on 
clove cigarettes was unjustifiably discriminatory because the ban exempted 
menthol-flavored cigarettes—a product considered “like” for international 
trade purposes.26 The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative reacted to such 
decision with disappointment, stating: “The ban on cigarettes with flavors is 
part of landmark U.S. legislation to combat the public health crisis caused 
by tobacco products.”27 
After the United States failed to modify or repeal the discriminatory 
elements of the ban in response to the decision (as required by WTO rules), 
Indonesia requested the organization to authorize retaliation against the 
United States. Prior to the imposition of retaliation, however, the dispute 
settled—the United States and Indonesia agreed on a series of measures in 
exchange for keeping the ban in place as well as the exception on menthols. 
The value of those measures to American tax payers was around US$55 
million.28 
Perhaps what is most interesting about this dispute is not that an iconic 
American company now based in Switzerland (mostly for tax purposes) 
lobbied the Indonesian government (through its subsidiary) to bring the case 
to defend clove-flavored cigarettes’ market access, but that PMI, that same 
company, controlled the largest share of the menthols market in the United 
States.  In essence, PMI’s interests were represented by both sides of the 
litigation in this case—by the United States that defended the exception to 
 
 25. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A). 
 26. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, ¶ 298, WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012). 
 27. Tom Miles & Doug Palmer, WTO Dents U.S. Ban on Clove Cigarettes, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2012, 
12:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wto-usa-indonesia/wto-dents-u-s-ban-on-clove-
cigarettes-idUSBRE8330Y720120404. 
 28. Indonesia Announces Deal with U.S. on Clove Cigarettes Trade Dispute, BRIDGES, Oct. 9, 2014, 
at 1. 
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favor menthols and by Indonesia that challenged the arbitrariness of banning 
some, but not all flavored cigarettes. 
Ironically, the menthol-flavored exemption was heavily pushed by PMI 
in the legislative process. According to a 2011 report, PMI would have 
withdrawn its support for the Act if a blanket flavored-cigarette prohibition 
was adopted, even though a menthol ban would reduce public health costs 
and save thousands of lives, especially among African and Native American 
as well as Hispanic females.29 PMI strongly fought for the exemption 
because these cigarettes are an “attractive starter product for new [female] 
smokers”—precisely the same reason given by the United States to ban 
clove-flavored cigarettes.30 
Figure 2: Menthol use among smokers by populations (2010) 
(Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration) 
B. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
The recent tactics employed by PMI against attempts to spread anti-
smoking protections and to coordinate stronger tobacco regulations across 
nations seem more audacious—at least to the eyes of anti-tobacco advocates. 
With the global expansion of tobacco, international control efforts have also 
 
 29. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute of Health, National Cancer 
Institute, 2017 Smokefree.gov. Menthol Cigarettes. 
 30. Id. 
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emerged.  Chief among these efforts is the FCTC, which took effect in 2005 
and has been ratified by 180 members (holdouts include Cuba, Haiti, and the 
United States).31 
This international treaty’s main goal is “to reduce continually and 
substantially the prevalence of tobacco use and exposure to tobacco 
smoke.”32 To curb demand, it recommends measures such as: regulation of 
the contents of products; requirements for disclosures and for the packaging 
and labeling of products; promotion of educational and public awareness 
efforts; and regulation of advertising, sponsorship, and promotion. On the 
supply side, the FCTC addresses illicit trade in tobacco products, sales to and 
by minors, and provision of support for economically viable alternatives for 
farmers.  Notably, the FCTC states that “nothing in [the treaty] shall prevent 
a Party from imposing stricter requirements that are consistent with their 
provisions and are in accordance with international law.”33 
Since the treaty entered into force more than a decade ago, a number of 
States including Australia, Uruguay, Norway, and members of the European 
Union (“EU”) have introduced control measures that conform to or are based 
on it—most notably, advertisement restrictions and “plain packaging” 
requirements. These requirements usually prohibit companies from printing 
logos, symbols, and other bright images on cigarette packets and, in some 
cases, mandate “generic packaging,” a particular shade of drab dark brown 
for all tobacco products (see, figure 3 below). There is no “tobacco court” in 
charge of enforcing the FCTC’s commitments or drawing the limits between 
potentially conflicting obligations. The Convention simply provides a 
number of “Guidelines for Implementation” issued by the governing body, 
intended to help parties implement their treaty obligations (though the legal 
status of the guidelines is ambiguous).34 
In response to the growing number of countries adopting regulations 
conforming to or based on the Convention, PMI (or a subsidiary or 
government acting on PMI’s behalf) has sparked litigation before 
international courts and tribunals. By relying on obligations of commercial 
nature adopted by countries in different treaties, PMI has been able to 
challenge regulations internationally. In essence, these challenges attempt to 
frame tobacco control measures as not “in accordance with international 
 
 31. Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/. 
 32. FCTC, art. III.  
 33. Id. at art. II (emphasis added). 
 34. See Sam Foster Halabi, The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control: An Analysis of Guidelines Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 121, 125–26 (2010) (comparing competing interpretations of the legal significance of the COP 
guidelines). 
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law” and therefore in conflict with the FCTC.35 As I detail now, PMI’s 
interests have been represented in five different types of proceedings with 
the goal of undermining the regulations and, indirectly, the goals of the 
FCTC. 
Figure 3: Plain Packaging as Required by Australian Act (2011) 
-Investor-State Dispute Settlement: PMI has used the expensive system 
and expansive provisions of ISDS to challenge regulations, claim substantial 
money in damages, and deter countries from adopting similar measures. 
First, through a local subsidiary, PMI filed an unsuccessful case under the 
Switzerland-Uruguay bilateral investment treaty targeting Uruguay’s 
legislation requiring all manufacturers to adopt a single presentation and 
graphic warnings covering 80% of the cigarette package. PMI claimed, 
among other violations, that the irregular regulatory process and the resulting 
regulation breached the “fair-and-equitable-treatment” standard of the treaty. 
That same year, PM Asia, a Hong Kong subsidiary of PMI and owner 
of PM Australia, filed for arbitration under the Hong Kong-Australia 
bilateral investment treaty against legislation mandating “generic 
 
 35. For a discussion on the relationship between the FCTC and the WTO, see Harold Hongju Koh, 
Global Tobacco Control as a Health and Human Rights Imperative, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 433, 438 (2016) 
(arguing that “human rights and public health concerns can be both a shield and a sword—a valid defense 
against a claimed WTO violation and a valid way to challenge national action that undermines these 
concerns”). 
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packaging” and other advertisement restrictions.36 To institute this second 
arbitration process, PM Asia acquired its shares in PM Australia four months 
prior to filing the case, but just after Australia’s announcement of a 
legislative proposal that later became the actual statute.37 Australia 
challenged this matter as a jurisdictional issue and won on these grounds, but 
Australia also maintained that the law was a legitimate exercise of 
authority.38 While the dismissal of PMI’s claim without addressing the legal 
merits gave Australia a decisive victory, uncertainty remains about how 
precisely investment agreements restrict tobacco control efforts—in part due 
also to a dissenting opinion in the victory by Uruguay in the prior case.39 
-WTO-Dispute Settlement: The two ISDS cases referred to above served 
as a prelude to the more significant and still pending trade law dispute—
which could potentially lead to the modification or repeal of the Australian 
plain packaging legislation (yet, this possibility is unlikely). 
After testing a version of the same argument in the Uruguayan case, PM 
Asia argued in the ISDS case against Australia that the broad provisions of 
the bilateral investment treaty could be used to import Australia’s other 
international obligations into the claim, including those enshrined in the 
WTO Agreements, i.e., TBT and TRIPS.40 In the international trade arena, 
like in the arbitration, the complainants maintain that the Australian Act 
violates the very same WTO Agreements.41 Moreover, it is well documented 
that the Dominican Republic, and to some extent Indonesia, are both 
advancing interests similar to those of PMI in the dispute. In fact, the 
company itself admits to paying these complaining States’ legal fees.42 Both 
 
 36. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, H.K.-Austl., Sep. 15, 1993, 1748 
U.N.T.S. 385; Philip Morris Asia v. the Commonwealth of Australia, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 4.15–5.17, 
7.15–7.17 (Nov. 21, 2011). For Uruguay see Philip Morris Products S.A. et al. v. Uruguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/7 (2010), Award (Jul. 8, 2016) ¶¶ 235–309. 
 37. Australian Government, Australia’s Response to the Notice of Arbitration, Philip Morris Asia 
Ltd. v. the Commonwealth of Australia 2 (2011). 
 38. Id. ¶ 36–39; Philip Morris Asia Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015) ¶¶ 585–88. 
 39. Philip Morris Products S.A. et al. v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (2010), Concurring 
and Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Gary Born, ¶ 5 (July 8, 2016). 
 40.  This argument links the WTO agreements with the BIT protections. See Notice of Arbitration, 
supra note 36 ¶ 7.15–7.16. 
 41.  The current four complainants are Cuba, Indonesia, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. 
See Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain 
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WORLD TRADE ORG. (May 5, 
2014), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds467_e.htm (concerning matters labeled 
DS435, DS441, DS458, and DS467). 
 42.  Myron Levin, Tobacco Industry Uses Trade Pacts to Try to Snuff out Anti-
Smoking Laws, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/29/ 
15519194-tobacco-industry-uses-trade-pacts-to-try-to-snuff-out-anti-smoking-laws; see also Amy 
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countries are alleging that the WTO Agreements support a claimed 
unrestricted right to use brands and other symbols with respect to tobacco 
products. 
Essentially, the “rule importation” strategy affords PMI two 
opportunities to shape the interpretation of international trade rules as a way 
to set limits on the regulation of tobacco marketing. It is exposing the same 
tobacco control measure to oversight by two different tribunals.  This 
aggressive testing of the “regulatory space” is used to signal resolve by a 
litigious actor that may seek to dissuade other nations from adopting similar 
measures for fear of a confrontation with a giant company.  According to the 
Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, tobacco companies have threatened poor 
African countries considering similar legislation.43 
-Litigation Before European Courts: Parallel to the WTO and ISDS 
battles, PMI has instituted extensive litigation against European regulations 
based on the FCTC. Three international European courts have been 
implicated in PMI’s legal efforts. 
First, PMI attempted to invalidate the 2014 EU Tobacco Products 
Directive as a whole as a well as various provisions within it and domestic 
regulations based on the directive.44  While all the legal challenges were 
eventually dismissed by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), the picture 
that emerges from the litigation and resulting case law is more complex than 
the frequent depiction of an unqualified victory for tobacco control efforts. 
To see this, one needs to understand first what are the possible regulatory 
preferences of an actor with a dominant market position like PMI and how 
these preferences relate to the outcomes in international litigation. 
As I have argued in the past, the tobacco industry tends to rely on 
specific concepts of international law, especially international economic and 
business law, to defend its turf. Mainly, the industry relies on four pillars: 
(i) property rights, especially intellectual property rights (brands); 
(ii) nondiscrimination in taxation and regulation; (iii) limits to quantitative 
and trade restrictive measures; and (iv) regulatory subsidiarity. Based on 
these concepts, the industry often claims—falsely in my view—that 
appropriately regulated tobacco can contribute to welfare and development; 
that nondiscriminatory regulation enhances the formal economy and 
 
Corderoy, Mystery over Ukraine Tobacco Law Challenge, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/mystery-over-ukraine-tobacco-law-challenge-
20120326-1vunl.html. 
 43.  Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Firms’ Strategy Limits Poorer Nations’ Smoking Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013) at A1. 
 44.  Case C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands SARL v. Sec’y of State for Health, 2016 E.C.R. 325. See 
also Case C-358/14, Republic of Poland v. European Parliament, 2016 E.C.R. 323 (Poland has a 
production facility owned by PMI.). 
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supports farming communities; that local sales taxes are more effective 
regulatory alternatives; and that transnational efforts may contradict, 
undermine or conflict with domestic regulatory preferences. PMI, in 
particular, mirrors these preferences almost with exact precision—perhaps 
with the caveat of being less averse to harmonization than other members of 
the industry. Hence, in the context of the European challenges the company 
argued that Member States and not the EU are the appropriate authority to 
regulate tobacco. Yet, if there is a valid union-wide directive, it should 
preempt additional requirements that create trade impediments and aim at 
harmonizing State regulation. 
While the decisions of the ECJ show a great deal of deference to 
regulations, they pose a unique quandary for the regulatory sovereignty of 
individual States within the EU. The ECJ confirmed that the requirements 
applied only within the EU45—despite the fact that extraterritorial application 
of the regulation could enhance control efforts.46 Moreover, the ECJ 
emphasized that tobacco regulations at the union-level are appropriate 
because they avoid the potential barriers to free trade posed by each EU 
Member State adopting its own framework. Hence, if an EU Member State 
were to impose some stricter requirements while other EU Member States 
did not, it could create the type of regulatory divergences that the ECJ 
suggests should be prevented. These divergences, in and of themselves, 
seemingly represent a species of obstacle to trade. Unless the EU devises 
union-wide directives, it would be somewhat problematic for the EU 
Member States to pass them on their own—constraining the “stricter 
requirements” anticipated in the FCTC. 
Thus, while the ECJ is deferential to broad regulations on tobacco 
products in the interest of public health, such regulations must apply in a 
manner that is uniform, and does not involve unjustifiable discrimination, 
unnecessary obstacles to trade, or extraterritorial effects. As in the WTO 
dispute, some of the same arguments were previously tested by PMI before 
another international court—the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade 
Association States (EFTA Court).47 There, PMI argued that Norway’s ban 
on the display of tobacco products for sale was akin to a quantitative 
restriction on the import of tobacco products prohibited under the Agreement 
on the European Economic Area.48 
 
 45.  Philip Morris Brand SARL v. Sec’y of State for Health, supra note 44, ¶ 209. 
 46.  To be sure, a precedent existed for this position resulting from prior challenges to an earlier 
European tobacco regulation. See Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Health, 2002 E.C.R. 
I-11453 ¶¶ 209, 217. Other members of the industry participated in this case. 
 47.  Case E-16/10, Philip Morris Norway AS v. The Norwegian State, 2011 E.F.T.A.C. (2011). 
 48.  Id. ¶ 5. 
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But possibly the most extreme of PMI’s tactics in Europe is what seems 
to be the indirect use of human rights courts to defend its interests.  In 
Vékony v. Hungary, a citizen challenged a tobacco control measure that 
required all retailers wishing to sell tobacco to apply for a license and 
conform with legal requirements to limit to the utmost the access of minors 
to tobacco products. This challenge was brought before the European Court 
of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) on the basis that Hungary’s denial of the license 
unlawfully affected the peaceful enjoyment of possessions in violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.49 Mr. Vékony’s family owned a 
grocery store that made roughly a third of its profits on the sale of tobacco 
prior to the measure.50 Vékony’s family applied for a tobacco retail 
concession, but was denied, and therefore the applicant’s family was obliged 
to terminate the sale of tobacco products.51 Surprisingly, the ECtHR held in 
favor of Vékony, stating that the measure reflected Hungary’s obligations 
under the FCTC and that European states “enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation;” nevertheless, the Court observed, that the decision was 
“verging on arbitrariness . . . [and imposed] excessive individual burden due 
to the control measure.”52 While reasonable people may disagree on the 
convenience of allowing human rights-based challenges from tobacco 
products distributors when facing regulatory decision perceived as arbitrary, 
most of them would be outraged to know that a member of the Vékony 
family appears to be a brand management executive for PMI in Hungary.53 
III. GLOBALIZATION, TOBACCO REGULATION AND 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
A. Explaining the Carve-Out Choice 
The case study of PMI litigation helps explain the particular choice by 
the TPP negotiators—an exceptional insulation of “tobacco control 
measures” from direct legal challenges by corporations. It reveals well-
founded concerns in the sophisticated use of international dispute settlement 
to manipulate litigation with the goal of defying attempts to constrain 
companies that sell—to quote from the WHO—the “only legally available 
 
 49.  Vékony v. Hungary, App. No. 65681/13, E.C.H.R. (2016), ¶ 3. 
 50. Id. ¶ 6. 
 51. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 35–37. 
 53. Profile of Balázs Vékony, Brand Executive, Philip Morris International, LINKEDIN,  
https://www.linkedin.com/in/bal%25C3%25A1zs-v%25C3%25A9kony-65574842 (last visited Feb. 3, 
2018). 
PUIG FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2018  7:07 AM 
2018] THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TOBACCO TACTICS 511 
product that kills up to one half of its regular users.”54 While the litigious 
nature of the tobacco industry has been long-acknowledged, the 
internationalization of this strategy is a relatively new phenomenon.55 
PMI’s decade-long legal battle has been relatively successful—despite 
seemingly “losing” most individual disputes. Arguably, it has resulted in: 
(i) delaying or “chilling” the implementation of new laws (and, presumably 
the resulting profits from that delay); (ii) inserting uncertainty about how 
precisely international commercial (and possibly other) agreements 
constrain anti-smoking efforts; and, (iii) establishing some explicit limits, 
including restrictions to treat similar risks differently (WTO), affirming 
union-wide tobacco control directives over potentially stronger go-it-alone 
regulations (ECJ), and confirming some protections that benefit the industry 
under property rights regimes (possessions (ECtHR), investment (ISDS), 
and intellectual property (WTO)). 
To a large extent, the litigation strategy has required the deployment of 
resources and subsidiaries by the largest tobacco multinational corporation 
for forum planning, forum enhancement, and facilitation of procedure—or, 
in less technical terms, “forum and nationality shopping.”56 Each of these 
deployments of subsidiaries may have an “antidote;” a treaty provision that 
prevents (ab)using the legal process in undesirable ways. For instance, 
jurisdictional and admissibility requirements (e.g., “substantial” business 
activities, “continuous-nationality,” “covered investments,” or “relate to” 
clauses) have been included in newer bilateral investment treaties and some 
as a result of concerns over PMI’s nationality shopping in the Australian 
case.57 Other clarifications in legal text can also prevent the use of these 
tactics for the sole purpose of stimulating litigation to set “precedent” or 
collecting damages in spite of limited roots in the host State.58 Moreover, 
 
 54. World Health Org. [WHO], TOBACCO FREE INITIATIVE (TFI): TOBACCO PRODUCT 
REGULATION, (2016). 
 55. See Robert L. Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Promise, LOY. L. 
REV. 1721, 1722 (2008). 
 56. BJÖRN P. EBERT, FORUM SHOPPING IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: FORUM PLANNING, 
FORUM ENHANCEMENT, AND FACILITATION OF PROCEDURE- ASSESSMENT AND LIMITS (MOHR SIEBECK 
2017). 
 57. See, e.g., German Model Treaty art. 8 (2008), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf (clarifying scope of application); Norway 
Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty arts. 2–16 (2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/archive/ita1031.pdf [hereinafter Norway Draft Model BIT] (clarifying Right to Regulate and abuse 
of rights under this agreement); U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty arts. 1, 2, 29 (2012), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1028.pdf (clarifying scope and coverage, “relating 
to,” consolidation, etc. as well as the annexes).  
 58. See, e.g., Public Citizen et al., Key Elements of Damaging U.S. Trade Agreement Investment 
Rules that Must Not Be Replicated in TPP, 14–15 (Feb. 2012), http://www.citizen.org/documents/tpp-
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governments could use consolidation proceedings or the inclusion of “stay 
and underride” proceedings to help guide the interaction of tribunals 
deciding similar matters, under different treaties (like the WTO rule-
importation to the ISDS proceedings example). 
Nevertheless, there are contexts where forum or nationality shopping 
may be legitimate and defensible. They can be employed to “maximize” the 
protection offered by international law to commercial actors—most of which 
do not sell cancerous consumer products. Moreover, from a practical 
perspective, it is impossible to catalog all the consequences of the 
multiplicity of international treaties and the resulting structures, overlapping 
jurisdictions, and parallel lawmakers. This makes it particularly difficult to 
preemptively sort out all the undesirable manipulations that economic 
agreements may generate, while allowing room for litigation strategies that 
are desirable and increase certainty or that can enable useful legal 
innovations. 
Moreover, the tobacco tactics also involve the filing of claims to set 
advantageous precedents.  International courts and tribunals, it may be 
thought, offer fewer benefits to litigants who file many costly suits to signal 
resolve or to ultimately generate legal precedent.  Many international 
decisions—including ISDS awards or WTO decisions—do not formally 
create precedent. However, this peculiarity of international litigation is often 
overstated.  As international adjudication has risen, the benefits to litigants 
from selecting cases and venues and signaling resolve have grown 
massively, in part because the cases involve issues such as food safety 
standards, emissions rules, taxation, and other matters that intrude deeply 
into national political affairs.59 As a result, not only do most international 
courts have certain levels of precedent and interpretative consistency at play, 
but precedent is now more important.  Hence, it is now more likely that 
economic actors decide to rely on these strategies to litigate for precedent 
rather than just to settle a discrete dispute.60 
Together, these reasons make it less defensible to allow challenges to 
tobacco regulation before ISDS—a setting where, in addition to other 
 
investment-fixes.pdf (recommending strategies to define “substantial business activities,” so as to avoid 
opportunistic “nationality planning”). 
 59. See, e.g., Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Republic 
of Ecuador, PCA (2009) (No. 2009-23) (involving a dispute of billions of dollars over an Ecuadorian 
court’s decision for environmental damage compensation as a potential denial of fair and equitable 
treatment). For food safety, see Appellate Body Report, UNITED STATES – CERTAIN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
LABELLING (COOL) REQUIREMENTS, WTO DOC. WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (Jun. 29, 2012) 
(regarding the consistency of “Country-of-Origin Labeling for Foods” with trade law). 
 60. Krzysztof Pelc, The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application, 
108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 547, 563 (2014). 
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shortcomings, claimants can select arbitrators who face limited oversight.  In 
economic terms, the use of ISDS by tobacco interests amounts to something 
akin to what economists refer to as “socially excessive litigation.”61 This 
situation can occur when litigants use a litigation system self-interestedly, to 
the point that there is an extreme divergence between the private and social 
costs. The private costs are tolerable or insignificant, but the social costs are 
unbearable or massive. 
In the case of tobacco, the danger of socially excessive litigation can be 
diminished by demanding the exercise of due care prior to bringing a claim. 
Under the carve-out, signatory parties to the TPP can still bring claims (either 
before a WTO or a TPP panel) if they believe another governmental party to 
the treaty is regulating tobacco products for trade-protectionist reasons rather 
than to protect public health. States have to make an active choice of 
defending tobacco interests (and with that assume some of the “political” 
costs), while at the same time considering multiple values and principles at 
stake.  States tend to exercise restraint (or due care) in the initiation of 
proceedings and bring actions that advance the complainant’s immediate or 
systemic interest.62 Yet, tobacco companies like PMI have shown little 
concern for States’ regulatory interests or the negative consequences of their 
litigation. Therefore, the response to limit the standing to litigate tobacco 
control measures is not only understandable, but—in my view—also 
justified. 
B. International Adjudicatory Aspects of Multinational Enterprise Theory 
Less than a decade ago, one of the leading treatises of international 
economics argued that the theory of multinational organizations was “still in 
its infancy.”63 This field, also known as MNE theory, aims at understanding 
the behavior of multinational enterprises, especially choices to own and 
control subsidiaries operating in countries other than the parent’s home 
country. The main focus of this strand of economics and management 
scholarship is to explain and predict the advantages provided by three main 
features of the organization of multinational firms: (1) ownership (firm-
specific control); (2) location (establishment in a country other than home); 
 
 61. See Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: 
Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 644 (2005). See also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS 
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 391 (2004). 
 62.  Pelc, supra note 60. For States, this calculation includes a careful balance between the likely 
benefits, including market access or a potentially good precedent, and the costs of bringing an action, 
including damage to diplomatic relations. 
 63. PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 
161 (7th Ed. Pearson Addison Wesley). 
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and (3) internalization (benefits of unified governance).64  How does the case 
study of PMI’s international legal battles and the resulting attempts to 
constrain the industry with “tobacco carve-outs” help to enrich MNE theory? 
Whether in its “infancy” or not, the vast knowledge already 
encompassed in MNE theory can hardly be refuted or seriously challenged 
with one case. At best, PMI’s case study can help introduce some concepts 
to refine MNE theory. In particular, authors have recognized the need to 
introduce “non-economic variables” and to integrate political and regulatory 
dimensions in the analysis. John H. Dunnings—often considered a pioneer 
of this field—in his eclectic paradigm or OLI-Framework argued for 
referring to government intervention of various kinds when discussing 
sources of Ownership, Location and Internalization advantages.65  However, 
he treated these as exogenous factors to which firms tended to respond or 
adapt; obstacles in the path to profits that needed to be overcome. 
In a lucid contribution, Jean Boddewyn argued against such an 
exclusive focus. Boddewyn (and, since then, others) explained that as a result 
of the blind spot of treating “non-economic variables”—social structure, the 
legal and governmental system, etc.—as exogenous, many authors tend to 
adopt “more autonomous views of the economic system and of the 
organizations and individuals participating in its functioning.”66 Other forms 
of competition, including an active contestation for rules, which may also be 
at play and are distinct to traditional market advantages (i.e., lower prices, 
superior products or better services) are left out of the analysis. In his 
exposition, Boddewyn specifically argued that “rules applying to 
international trade and foreign direct investment [are] not developed in a 
vacuum, but usually [are] the outcome of power plays by interested 
parties.”67 The rules of the economic game are—in his terms—not simply 
given but also “are often taken.”68 Other authors have since addressed non-
 
 64.  Jean Boddewyn, Political Aspects of MNE Theory, 46 J. OF INT’L. BUS. STUDIES, 341, 348 
(1988). As explained by Boddewyn, “[Dunning’s] paradigm explains why international production takes 
place, namely, that foreign direct investment (FDI) requires that a firm possess ownership (firm-specific) 
advantages which it finds beneficial to exploit by itself (the internalization advantage) in foreign countries 
offering location advantages.” See generally Thomas P. Murtha & Stefanie Ann Lenway, Country 
capabilities and the strategic state: How national political institutions affect multinational corporations’ 
strategies, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 113 (1994); T.A. POYNTER, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION (2012). 
 65. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (Per-Ove Hesselbon, 
Bertil Ohlin, Per Magnus, & Wijkman eds., 1977).  R.D. DUNNINGS & ROBERT D. PEARCE, THE WORLD'S 
LARGEST INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES 1962-1983 (2nd ed.1985). 
 66.  Boddewyn supra note 64, at 344. Boddewyn argues that the reluctance to account for other 
factors reflects an ideological preference for “market” terms. See id. at 344–46. 
 67.  Id. at 344. 
 68.  Id. 
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market variables like regulation or government policy as constraints 
providing substantive contribution for the parent.69 Overall, the literature 
suggests that market imperfections may result from the interaction between 
firms and their non-market environment; MNEs tend to facilitate such 
interactions in ways that other forms of business organizations may not. 
The analytical move to incorporate “non-economic variables” as also 
endogenous factors that provide benefits has significant implications for the 
conceptualization of ownership, location and internalization advantages. In 
particular, whether market imperfections may result from interactions 
between firms and their non-market environment helps to conceptualize 
other key advantages sought by MNEs. For one, government laws and 
policies are the target of different activities to generate different commercial 
advantages, which at the same time create new government responses that 
force MNEs to adapt. The ability to master such recursive processes across 
borders in a particular regulatory domain can be a key asset. In fact, it has 
long been understood that seeking trade or FDI protection is a lucrative 
activity. Yet, underappreciated is the increasing role that adjudicatory 
decision-making processes (international litigation options) available in 
treaties that control trade and FDI rules plays in creating such advantages.70 
Based on the above discussion, I conclude with a brief exposition of 
some modest ways that the adjudicatory aspects of international economic 
treaties may help to refine MNE theory. 
-Ownership Advantages: MNE theorists have noted that ownership 
advantages can be extended to account for knowledge or expertise that 
improves a company’s non-market environment, including its regulatory 
environment. Yet, legal expertise by MNEs is often ignored or neglected. As 
shown by the case study, this expertise can take the form of: (i) better 
understanding of the limits and opportunities created by national and, 
increasingly, international legal frameworks; (ii) access to legal mechanisms 
to challenge domestic regulations including before international court; and 
(iii) superior legal skills for handling expert legal advice, legal outcomes, 
and governmental responses to legal decisions. 
The key question is why MNEs own subsidiaries to deploy 
knowledge/expertise instead of relying on local firms that benefit from 
greater familiarity with local legal and regulatory environments, or domestic 
partners able to appeal to economic nationalism. To crystallize our 
understanding of this point, future research can hypothesize that concealing 
 
 69. Murtha, supra note 64, at 115; see generally T. A. POYNTER, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION (2012). 
 70..  Boddewyn, supra note 64, at 346–48. 
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rather than transferring legal knowledge as well as coordinating legal 
responses across units is a key ownership advantage, especially in heavily 
regulated environments like the tobacco sector. Moreover, the ability of 
MNE subsidiaries to access international dispute settlement and access 
“intermediate goods,” including support from the host government, and the 
advantages of multinationality that allow multiple dispute settlement 
options, often requires formal ownership. Whatever the increasing cost that 
results from ownership, it is partly overcome by the increasing options to 
rely on international litigation as a complementary way to deploy legal 
expertise and contest for the regulatory environment. 
-Location Advantages: Non-market variables may be relevant in 
deciding the location of foreign direct investments. Particularly relevant is 
subsidiary location for accessing international adjudication to challenge 
regulation. Various international treaties demand different requirements to 
effectively consider a corporation as “located” in a country for international 
litigation purposes and, in some cases, obtain the right to access international 
dispute settlement. The example of PMI establishing a subsidiary in Hong 
Kong for the sole purpose of taking advantage of ISDS shows the potential, 
but also the limits and perils of this strategy. In a similar cautionary note, in 
the plain packaging litigation context, Ukraine temporarily brought a claim 
espousing British American Tobacco, despite the fact that the former Soviet 
Republic had no direct interest in the Australian tobacco market. In fact, at 
that time Ukraine registered no trade flows with Australia. Ukraine has since 
suspended its involvement after one Ukrainian Member of Parliament 
expressed confusion when she learned that her country was a part of the 
litigation.71 What became apparent is that in exchange for the espousal of the 
company’s interest in defeating plain packaging, British American Tobacco 
may have committed to locate a manufacturing facility in Ukraine.72 
Increasingly, the potential to rely on a particular treaty to challenge 
governmental action provides location advantages. Because some of these 
options are touted as necessary to attract FDI and applicable only to foreign 
investors, MNEs can often rely on them in ways domestic entrepreneurs 
cannot. In this sense, legal standing or legal representation (via espousal) 
may affect the attractiveness of location as both host and home to MNE 
activity. Future research should account for the ways in which location is 
both endogenous and exogenous for the purpose of legal protection; location 
 
 71.  Norman Hermant, Ukraine Attacks Australia’s Plain Packaging Laws, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. 
(Apr. 17, 2012, 11:29 PM), www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2012/s3479769.htm. 
 72.  Levin, supra note 42; see also Amy Corderoy, Mystery over Ukraine Tobacco Law Challenge, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/mystery-
over-ukraine-tobacco-law-challenge-20120326-1vunl.html. 
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is driven by beneficial rules, but also creates beneficial rules through the 
ability to deploy MNEs’ legal capacity. 
-Internalization Advantages: Internalization refers to unified or intra-
firm governance structure (as opposed to inter-firm transaction or “market”) 
to obtain relevant intermediate goods or services. Specific non-market 
advantages that result from internalization include intelligence, political 
access and influence, and the like. 
For some time, scholars have noted that internalization, together with 
ownership and location advantages, affects the political risks encountered by 
MNEs. To some extent, internalization can be a way to limit risks by 
accessing protections of politically influential or similarly well-connected 
actors. That is, there is a market for beneficial government decisions because 
States must compete for foreign direct investment and resulting benefits, 
including by offering enticements, subsidies or specific assurances of FDI 
protection. In turn, MNEs often “shop” amongst States by bargaining with 
governments for beneficial government decisions with long-term 
commitments of FDI.73 
What the PMI case study reveals is the existence of a market for 
affirmative representation before international dispute settlement—think, for 
instance, of the two disputes brought by Indonesia and the Dominican 
Republic before the WTO espousing interests that closely aligned with 
PMI’s interests.74 In more theoretical terms, it is reasonable to assume the 
existence of a market for the services of nation-States in the 
conceptualization of internalization advantages.75 
Incorporating international adjudicatory aspects to this assumption 
involves recognizing that in the market for the services of nation-States, 
government officials control a set of intangibles, including the decision to 
espouse international legal claims that advance private interests. Hence, 
knowledge/expertise about activating relevant decision-makers as well as 
national allegiances creates advantages that shall be internalized because 
only the top managers can obtain access to and deploy such knowledge. To 
some extent, the advantage of representation in international litigation is a 
 
 73.  To be sure, companies in industries like tobacco may have many reasons to commit FDI to 
improve sourcing, pricing or quality. See John M. Connor, Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment by 
Food and Tobacco Manufacturers, 65 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 395, 402 (1983). 
 74.  Trade lawyers have long recognized that parties may bring a case of low economic value for 
different reasons, including supporting a foreign investor reflected in the EC-Bananas saga. See Gregory 
Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 269, 296 (Wayne Sandholtz & Christopher A. 
Whytock eds., 2017). 
 75.  See generally Peter J. Buckley & Mark Casson, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1985). 
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way of translating private needs into national policies or interests (think of 
Indonesia) which require cooperation at the highest levels. Hence, only 
internalization can create the necessary synergies between management and 
governmental officials. 
But the situation of a “market for espousal” before international dispute 
settlement is also fraught with high opportunism and arbitrariness.  In 
contrast, ISDS is a form of effecting or curtailing such a “market for 
espousal.” Through ISDS, a foreign investor can access directly international 
litigation without the need for a government espousing a claim.  By removing 
the need for diplomatic protection through the granting of a private right of 
action, a foreign investor has much more control, including the ability to 
influence legal regimes by bringing arguments that better fit the regulatory 
preferences of the MNE. In exchange for that “private right of action,” 
international rules may demand that MNEs exercise control over a domestic 
subsidiary, that is, to internalize them under unified governance. This move 
helps translate litigation strategies into a tactical advantage. Instead, with 
ISDS, governments attempting regulatory harmonization may be the target 
of legal claims designed to generate firm-specific advantages like delaying, 
preempting, and weakening regulations. 
 * * * 
For years, authors have argued that knowledge and experience 
“distinguishes the winners from the losers and mere survivors in global 
competition.”76 Acknowledging international adjudicatory aspects in MNE 
theory helps to understand the new terrain of non-market considerations that 
provide competitive advantages such as legal and regulatory expertise. For 
litigious firms like PMI, the purpose of filing international claims is to show 
a willingness to bear some costs and to impose large costs on others across a 
whole portfolio of possible cases.  In other words, as a matter of strategy, 
PMI files negative-value cases with the goal of signaling resolve and 
obtaining the most favorable legal rulings and precedents.  For such MNEs, 
international litigation serves a complementary regulatory strategy; one that 
entails earning a reputation for being tough and creating favorable case law, 
not necessarily for winning any singular case.77 Owning and extending 
control over subsidiaries operating in countries other than the parent’s home 
country enhances this strategy and should be considered in future research. 
 
 76.  G. Richard Shell, MAKE THE RULES OR YOUR RIVALS WILL (2004) (“[H]e who makes the rules 
makes the money.”). 
 77.  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sergio Puig & David G. Victor, Against Secrecy: The Social Cost of 
International Dispute Settlement, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 279, 312 (2017). 
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CONCLUSION 
In January of 2017, PMI issued a press release stating that the company 
intended to move its business away from combustible tobacco products 
entirely.78 Some may welcome this move and attribute it to the series of 
defeats in high-profile litigations against States adopting plain-packaging 
regulation and advertisement requirements.  That may be only partially true. 
Rather, PMI may have seen the change in the regulatory tide and decided to 
move in this direction as a viable business model. In the process, the tobacco 
giant did not want to fall without putting up a fight, a fight that has resulted 
in delaying or “chilling” the implementation of laws (and resulting profits 
from that delay) by adding uncertainty about how precisely commercial 
agreements restrict tobacco control efforts.  The strategy has created some 
explicit limits that could benefit their future line of business (potentially less 
damaging tobacco products). In particular, it has succeeded in preempting 
other nations from adopting measures that treat similar risks differently (e-
cigarettes), affirming union-wide tobacco control directives in favor of go-
it-alone regulations in States that are members of the EU and the potential of 
protection under property rights regimes (possessions, investment, and 
intellectual). 
For the first time, international commercial agreements are starting to 
treat differently a popular yet cancerous product.  What justifies this 
disparate treatment is not its hazardous nature similar to other consumer 
products in the marketplace like sugary drinks, asbestos fibers or alcoholic 
beverages but the sophisticated use of international courts and legal 
knowledge by MNEs with global presence in this business. Such tactics 
suggest that the industry incentive to bring litigation is socially excessive 
and may result in the undermining of regulatory efforts that in turn 
exacerbates health costs. Hence, tobacco carve-outs are a welcome 
development in international law that should be adopted by existing and 
future commercial agreements. 
At a theoretical level, the case study of PMI’s use of international courts 
and tribunals underscores the growing relevance of expertise in international 
business and economic law. As international law increasingly concerns the 
coordination of regulatory domains previously considered a national 
prerogative, firms and governments have radically expanded the use of 
international dispute settlement procedures. Understanding the choices to 
own and extend control over subsidiaries operating abroad with the purpose 
 
 78.  Philip Morris International Looks Toward a Smoke-Free Future, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170125005433/en/Philip-Morris-International-Smoke-
Free-Future. 
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of deploying legal capacity to effect legal rules today is understanding how 
corporations and international law interact. 
 
